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Abstract 
In this article we provide a simple model of the marriage market where singles search for 
spouses. In our model economy men and women live for many years and they differ in their 
survival probabilities, in their fecundity, and in their earnings. We show that modelling the 
marriage decision in a very simple model economy is sufficient to account for much of the 
observed marriage behavior in the United States in the year 2000. We conclude that gender 
differences in fecundity are all important in accounting for marriage behavior, and that 
differences in earnings matter little. We also conclude that, even though they are in short supply, 
the market power of fecund women is not enough for them to demand compensation in all 
cases. And that studying the marriage decision without modelling explicitly the roles played by 
age and by fecundity, as has been typically done by the previous literature, makes little sense. 
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1 Introduction
Over time and across societies women tend to marry older men. In the United States, the age
difference at first marriage has remained stable since World War II. According to the United
States Census in 1950 first-time grooms were 2.5 years older than first-time brides in median.
Forty years later, in spite of large socioeconomic changes, first-time grooms were still 2.3 years
older (see Panel A of Figure 1). In this article we try to understand what determines the
timing of first marriages and we quantify the roles played by gender differences in earnings
and fecundity in determining this timing. We find that gender differences in fecundity are all
important and that differences in earnings matter little.
To construct our argument, we compare the steady states of several overlapping generations
model economies. Our model economies are populated by men and women who live for many
periods, meet at random, and decide whether to marry. As in the real world, in our model
economies people marry because they value each other’s company, because they value bearing
children, and because they value the income sharing features of marriage. Unlike the real
world, in our model economies marriages last until “death does them apart” and widows and
widowers never remarry. We assume also that the only economic decision that singles make is
whether to marry, and that married people make no economic decisions whatsoever. It turns
out that studying first marriages in such a simplified model world is sufficient to make our
argument convincingly.
Unlike the real world, love plays no role in our model economies. In our model economies,
when two people meet, they each draw a realization of a random process that determines the
value of that match for the other partner. Based on this match value, on the partner’s age,
and on the partner’s earnings and fecundity profiles, they compute their expected life-time
values of the marriage. They compare them with their expected values of remaining single.
And they decide whether to propose. When both partners propose the meeting ends up in a
marriage. Otherwise both partners remain single until they participate in a meeting that ends
up in a marriage sometime in the future. Important features of this article are that we consider
people’s age as an explicit determinant of marriage behavior, that we model the search for
spouses as a costly activity, that we endogenize the single sex ratios fully, and that we take
the literature one step further by making our arguments fully quantitative.
As in the real world, in our benchmark model economy men earn more than women, they
are fecund for a sizably longer period of their lives, and their life-expectancy is shorter. In
this model economy we take the gender earnings profiles, the fecundity profiles, and the sur-
vival probabilities directly from United States data (see Panels B, C, D, and E of Figure 1).
Naturally, in our setup the decision of whether to marry depends crucially on the shape of the
utility function and on the utility shares of childbearing and company and marital income,
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which we lump together for convenience. We assume a fairly standard utility function with unit
elasticity of substitution between its arguments. We show that our benchmark model econ-
omy approximates the main United States marriage-related age distributions to a comfortingly
large extent (see Figure 2). And that it does so using only two free parameters.
Once we have established that our model world is a reasonable abstraction to study the
timing of first marriages, we use it to quantify the roles played by earnings and fecundity in
determining this timing. To do so we solve three counterfactual model economies. In the first
model economy men and women are exactly alike. They all have the same life-time earnings
and fecundity profiles as the men in the benchmark model economy, and the same survival
probabilities as the women. In the second counterfactual model economy men and women
differ in their earnings profiles only, and in the third one they differ in their fecundity profiles
only.
Naturally in the model economy in which men and women are exactly alike their marriage
decisions are identical, and the median age difference between first-time grooms and brides is
zero. In contrast, when men and women differ in their earnings only, men of every age become
choosier and women of every age become less so. Whether these changes delay or advance
the timing of first marriages is a quantitative question to be answered by our model. It turns
out that reducing the earnings of women delays the median age of both first-time grooms
and brides. The age of grooms by 0.27 years and the age of brides by 0.17 years. Therefore
the overall effect of the gender earnings gap is to increase the median age difference at first
marriage by 0.11 years.
The marriage behavior in the model economy in which men and women differ in their
fecundity only is even more interesting. This is because reducing the fecundity of women makes
younger women more attractive to men, and older women less so. Consequently, reducing the
fecundity of women leads men to lower their reservation values for younger women, and to
raise them for older women whose fecundity starts to decline. Women’s shorter biological clock
increases their cost of searching for a spouse. And it makes young fecund women lower their
reservation values for fecund men. In contrast, older women who can no longer bear children
become choosier. And they raise their reservation values for fecund men. When we put these
effects together, it turns out that reducing the fecundity of women delays the median age of
grooms by 1.57 years, and that it advances the median age of brides by 1.22 years. Therefore
the gender fecundity gap increases the median age difference at first marriage by a whooping
2.79 years. This number is many times larger than the 0.11 years that obtain when men and
women differ in their earnings profiles only. And it leads us to conclude that, to account for
the timing of first marriages quantitatively, gender differences in fecundity are all important
and gender differences in earnings matter little.
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Previous literature and the contribution of this article. There is a large body of literature
on the implications of gender differences for marriage behavior in biology, economics and in
the other social sciences.1 Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) is one of the early formal studies
of the timing of marriages in economics. They model the marriage decision as a two period
waiting game with incomplete information. Like we do, the only economic decision that they
study is when to marry. People in their model economy differ in match quality. But unlike us,
while the quality of their young women is public information, the quality of their young men
is private information. They use an assortative matching rule and they show that there exists
a unique equilibrium in which every woman marries young —albeit by construction. The top
quality young women marry the top quality old men, and the remaining young women marry
young lower quality men. Thereby men marry at an older age that women on average. In the
last sentence of the section where they describe the marriage market equilibrium, Bergstrom
and Bagnoli state that “A thorough treatment of strategies of this type must await a model
with a more detailed search theory and with more than two possible ages of marriage”.2 The
wait is over: the model economies described in this article include these two features.
The next path-breaking milestone in the economics literature is Siow (1998). Siow uses
Bergstrom and Bagnoli’s idea that the marriage quality of males is uncertain and he takes it
one step further. He studies a much richer economic environment where risky human capital
accumulation, parental investment in children, and labor markets interact with the marriage
decision and determine gender roles. Like Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), Siow studies a two-
period model economy. And he shows that it accounts for many of the observed qualitative
features of marriages including the fact that grooms tend to be older than their brides on
average. However this result arises because he assumes that women are fecund only when
young, and that people marry only to have children. The age difference appears because
successful old men outbid young men in their competition for young women, and because
every woman marries when young —once again, by construction. In the last line of his article
Siow states that “the quantitative significance of the concerns discussed here for explaining
gender roles remains to be established”.3 In this article we study the roles played by gender
differences in fecundity and earnings in accounting for the timing of marriages. And we
quantify their significance.
Continuing with this line of argument, a more recent contribution is Hamilton and Siow
(2007). This article is particularly interesting because it uses a detailed 18th century dataset
1In the biology camp Trivers (1972) is one of the first to study the implications of differential fecundity. In
the economics camp, Akerloff, Yelin and Katz (1996), Edlund (1998), and Willis (1999) study the implications
of differential fecundity for out of wedlock childbearing. And Siow and Zhu (1998) study the implications
of differential fecundity for gender biased parental investment in children. For many other references outside
economics see Betzig (1999).
2See Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), page 190.
3See Siow (1998), page 352.
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from the Quebec region to estimate the contributions of differential fecundity, social het-
erogeneity, assortative matching, and search frictions in accounting for aggregate marriage
behavior. Hamilton and Siow also provide a behavioral model that is consistent with their
reduced form estimates. The main distinguishing feature of their study is that their model
people differ in social status. The only difference between their model men and women is that
women exit the marriage market at a higher rate than men because they receive an exogenous
shock that represents menopause —even though it is age-independent. This feature of their
model economy generates all the gender differences in marriage behavior including the age
difference at first marriage.
Age is not a state variable in Hamilton and Siow’s economy. As they admit themselves
“While inaccurate at the individual level, this is a convenient abstraction for studying aggregate
behavior. Fleshing out the model to fit individual level data is left for future research”.4 In our
model economies age is a state variable of the individual decision problem. We also provide a
structure that is consistent with the age distributions of many demographic statistics related
to marriage.
Another work related with this article is Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2003), who con-
structed a general equilibrium model of the timing of fertility and human capital accumulation.
They also model a marital process, which is the main force driving fertility delay. As children
demand time and salaries depend on labor experience (given the exogenous agent’s produc-
tivity), high productivity women have incentives to delay marriage and fertility and therefore
they become choosy in the marriage market. By delaying marriage, they are able to marry
a high productivity man in the future. The main result is that fertility rates are declining
in family income and lower-wage women have children earlier than do higher-wage women.
As in their model women marry men or their same generation, differences in marriage timing
between men and women are not analyzed in this paper.5
Three recent unpublished contributions to the literature of marriage that are both important
and somehow related to this article are Regal´ıa and R´ıos-Rull (2001), Giolito (2005), and Seitz
(2007). Regal´ıa and R´ıos-Rull (2001) study the causes of the large increase in the shares
of single females and single mothers that took place in the United States between 1975 and
1990. They calibrate a very detailed model economy in which marriage, divorce, fertility, and
education are all endogenous decisions. But in their model economy people age exponentially.
And their single sex ratios are independent of their marriage and divorce decisions and they
are always equal to one. Consequently, in their model economy people’s ages are irrelevant,
the search for spouses is costless, and they remain silent about the timing of marriages.
4See Hamilton and Siow (2007), page 551.
5Other important contributions to the literature of fecundity, economic incentives and marriage are Aiyagari,
Greenwood and Guner (2000) and Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2003).
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Giolito (2005) is a follow up of Giolito (2003) and it is an immediate precursor of this
article. He is the first to introduce age as a source of agents’ heterogeneity (in addition of
being a state variable) in a search model of marriage. He also the first to endogenize the single
sex ratios fully and to replicate the age distributions of newly-weds. Our model economy
has inherited these three features. Giolito (2005) studies a world men and women differ in
fecundity and mortality only. He shows that differences in fecundity suffice to account for most
of the observed features of the timing of marriages, if people care enough about child-bearing.
However, since he abstracts from gender differences in earnings, per force he cannot compare
the roles played by fecundity and earnings in accounting for the timing of marriages.
Seitz (2007) studies the effects of marriage market conditions on the marriage and employ-
ment behavior of blacks and whites. She models search for spouses in a way that is very similar
to ours. Her model world also resembles ours in that and her stocks of singles are endogenous
—although, in her world only partially. Moreover, she includes individual uncertainty and she
endogenizes the employment and the divorce decisions. This makes her model economy richer
than ours. But her agents’ decisions do not depend on their age. And this implies that her
structure cannot be used to study the timing of marriages.
Summing up, our contribution to the literature on marriage is the following: We focus on
the timing of marriages. We model the search for spouses as a costly activity. We endogenize
the single sex ratios fully. We consider people’s age as an explicit determinant of their marriage
decisions. And we show that it plays a key role in determining marriage behavior.
2 The model economy
We study a model of the marriage market whose participants are a continuum of men and a
continuum of women. Following the conventions of the United States Census we denote the
men with subindex i = 1 and the women with subindex i = 2. Men and women live for at
most T years, which we denote with subindex j = 16, 17, . . . , T . Our model economy men and
women can be either single or married. And they may also differ in their earnings, in their
fecundity, and in their longevity. Both men and women derive utility from their earnings and
from being married and having children.
In our model economy singles meet in heterosexual pairs at most once each period. When
two people meet each of them draws a random number which represents the value of the match
for the other person. Based on this information and on the prospective partner’s age, fecundity
and earnings they decide whether or not to propose. A meeting ends up in a marriage when
both partners propose. Otherwise both partners remain single and may participate in another
meeting sometime in the future. We assume that marriages last until “death does them apart”,
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and that widows and widowers never remarry. We also assume that the only economic decision
that singles make is whether to marry and that married people make no economic decisions
whatsoever.
2.1 Population dynamics
Each period every person in our model economy faces an exogenous probability of surviving
until the following period. We denote these probabilities by σij and we assume that they
are gender and age dependent and time-invariant. Since people live at most for T periods,
σ1T = σ2T = 0. Every period a measure ni(16) of sixteen year-old people of gender i enter the
economy. Therefore the gender and age distribution of people, {nit(j)}, is
nit(16) = ni(16) for all t and (1)
ni,t+1(j) = σijnit(j) for 16 < j ≤ T (2)
Expressions (1) and (2) and the assumptions that the survival probabilities are time-invariant
and that σ1T = σ2T = 0 imply that the total sex and age distribution of people in our model
economy converges to a stationary distribution which is independent of the marriage behavior.
Our assumptions also imply that when the survival probabilities of men and women of any
age differ, then the age-sex ratios of older people differ from each other and from the total
sex ratio. In contrast, when there are no gender differences in survival probabilities, then all
the age-sex ratios and the total sex ratio are identical and equal to the sex ratio of sixteen
year-olds. We denote this ratio by g(16) = n1(16)/n2(16), where variable g(i) is the sex ratio
of people of age i.6 Finally, our assumptions also imply that the probability that an a year-old
person of gender i survives until age b is
pi(a, b) =
b−1∏
j=a
σij (3)
2.2 Earnings
To model earnings, we assume that each period each person in our model economy receives an
exogenous and deterministic endowment of earnings which is gender and age dependent. We
denote this endowment by yij .
6Notice that, even though people get married in heterosexual pairs, the age-sex ratios of singles differ from
age-sex ratios of the total population because they depend on the marriage behavior.
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2.3 Fecundity
Measuring fecundity is hard and relating it to age is harder. According to Hassan and Killick
(2003), the effect of men’s age on fecundity, remains uncertain. Evaluation of standard sperm
and endocrine parameters in age groups is typically inaccurate, because these parameters do
not reflect the sperm fertilizing capacity or fecundability. Experiments that study the effect
of age on male fecundity have been criticized on methodological grounds for using age at
conception and for not taking into account confounding factors such as the age of the female
or coital frequency. Hassan and Killick study male infecundity by comparing the time to
pregnancy —measured from the onset of the attempts to achieve pregnancy— for men of
different age groups. They found that male aging, especially after ages 45 to 50 leads to a
significant increase in the time to pregnancy.
Wood and Weinstein (1988) study the fecundity of women. They distinguish between total
fecundability and effective fecundability. Total fecundability is a woman’s monthly probabil-
ity of any conception, regardless of its outcome. While effective fecundability is the woman’s
monthly probability of a conception that results in a live birth. Therefore, effective fecundabil-
ity accounts for the probability that a conception will end in an intra-uterine death. According
to Wood and Weinstein, after age 40, total fecundability changes rapidly as a result of large
changes in the ovarian function. Between ages 25 and 40, total fecundability is remarkably
constant. This finding suggests that any reduction in the physiological capacity to bear chil-
dren between ages 25 and 40 is attributable to an elevation in intra-uterine mortality rather
than to a decline in the ability to conceive. Even accounting for intra-uterine loss, however,
the pattern of effective fecundability remains fairly flat between ages 20 and 35.
Modeling these diffuse findings is not easy. We compromise as follows: We use fij to denote
that the probability that a person of gender i bears children at age j. We assume that this
probability is equal to one from age 16 until that person reaches age αi. Next we assume that
the probability of bearing children decreases linearly between ages αi and δi. And that it is
zero afterwards. To model the gender differences in fecundity, we assume that the age limits,
αi and δi vary for men and women. Formally,
fij =

1 for 16 ≤ j ≤ αi
(δi − j)/(δi − αi) for αi < j ≤ δi
0 for δi < j ≤ T
(4)
2.4 Fertility
To model fertility in a parsimonious way we assume that when an a year-old man marries a
b year-old woman they beget instantly and costlessly k children. We assume that the value
of parameter k is a function of the fecundity of the spouses at the time of the marriage.
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Specifically we assume that k = µf1af2b. Notice that the value of k is determined at the
moment of the marriage and that it remains unchanged for its duration. To simplify the
notation we do not use age subscripts for k.
2.5 The intangible values of marriage
To model the intangible values of marriage such as companionship and sexual fulfilment we
assume that when two people meet, they each draw an independent realization from a ran-
dom process that determines the value of that match for the other partner. We denote the
realizations by xi ∈ [0, 1], and the distribution by G (x).
2.6 The marriage contract
As we have already mentioned, in our model economy we assume that never-married singles
search for partners during their entire lifetimes; that people get married only once in their life-
times; that married couples never get divorced; and that widows and widowers never remarry.
Table 1: Marital Status at First Marriage
Bride’s Marital Status
Groom’s Marital Status Never Married Divorced Widow Row Total
Never Married 946,787 211,951 1,355 1,160,093
Share of Row Total (%) 81.6 18.3 0.1 100.0
Share of Column Total (%) 82.6 32.6 3.4 63.2
Share of Total Marriages (%) 51.6 11.5 0.1
Divorced 198,305 436,499 2,060 636,864
Share of Row Total (%) 31.1 68.5 0.3 100.0
Share of Column Total (%) 17.3 67.1 5.2 34.7
Share of Total Marriages (%) 10.8 23.8 0.1
Widower 547 2,090 35,940 38,577
Share of Row Total (%) 1.4 5.4 93.2 100.0
Share of Column Total (%) 0.1 0.3 91.3 2.1
Share of Total Marriages (%) 0.0 0.1 2.0
Column Total 1,145,639 650,540 39,355 1,835,534
Share of Row Total (%) 62.4 35.4 2.1 100.0
Share of Column Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Center for Health Statistics. The data are for 1995 and they account for 77% of the
total number of marriages celebrated in the United States during that year.
Although these assumptions may seem somewhat extreme, Table 1 shows that according
to the National Center for Health Statistics in 1995 in the United States marriages between
never previously married brides and grooms accounted for 51.6 percent of the total number
of marriages reported in that dataset. That same Table shows that in only 11.5 percent of
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the marriages a never previously married bride married a divorced groom and in only 10.8
percent a never previously married groom married a divorced bride. Finally, Table 1 shows
that widows and widowers participated in only 2.1 percent of the marriages.
In this article we focus exclusively on marriages between never married people because we
think that it is in those marriages where fecundity plays a larger role. A large share of divorced
people have children from their previous marriages. And the role that these children play in
determining the value of the current marriage is controversial.
2.7 Search
Costly double sided search for spouses is a distinguishing feature of our model economies. The
idea is that the probability of participating in a meeting depends on the ratio of available
singles. Since this ratio is fully endogenous in our model economies , our matching function
is also the way in which the aggregate effects feed back into the individual decision problem.
Let si(j) denote the number of j year-old singles of gender i and let Si =
∑T
j=16 si(j) denote
the total number of singles of gender i. Then the probability that a single man meets a single
b year-old woman is
q1(b) = ρ
[
min
(
S1
S2
, 1
)]
s2(b)
S2
(5)
In Expression (5) we use parameter 0 < ρ < 1 to measure the search frictions. Naturally
the closer that parameter ρ is to zero the less meetings there are and, consequently, the less
marriages. Notice that the probabilities of meeting a single woman of any given age are the
same for single men of every age. Also, since ρ < 1 singles do not participate in meetings every
period of their lives.
In our model economies the decision problem of single men and women are exactly identical.
For notational convenience we describe the problem and variables that pertain to single men
only. To obtain the corresponding variables for women simply substitute the 1’s for 2’s and
the b’s for a’s. For instance, the probability that a single woman meets a single a year-old
man is q2(a) = ρ [min (S2/S1, 1)] s1(a)/S1.
2.8 Payoffs
Let an a year-old single man meet a b year-old single woman who has drawn a match quality
x2. If they both propose to each other the meeting ends up in a marriage. And, while both
spouses are alive, the period utility for the husband is
u1(x2, y1a, y2b) = [x2(1 + k)]
θ [φ (y1a + y2b)]
1−θ (6)
10
In Expression (6) parameter 0<θ<1 is the utility share of being part of a family and parameter
0<φ<1 measures the economies of scale of living together. The first term of the right-hand
side of Expression 6 models the joys of living together and bearing children with one’s spouse.
The second term of that expression models the income sharing features of marriages. As is
the case with parameters k, parameter φ is determined at the time of the marriage. It is a
function of the fecundity of the spouses. And it never changes during the entire duration of
the marriage (see Section 3 for a detailed description of this parameter).
If either partner fails to propose, then they both remain single, and the man’s period
utility is
v1(y1a) = y1−θ1a (7)
Expression (7) represents also the period utility of a year-old widowers.
2.9 The decision problem of singles
In our model economy when two singles meet they compare their expected values of being
married until “death does them apart” with their expected values of remaining single and
meeting a different person sometime in the future. The value of marriage is uncertain because
lifetime durations and, consequently, marriage durations are uncertain. The value of remaining
single is uncertain for this reason and because meetings and, consequently, marriages are
uncertain. To compute these expected values, we must first calculate the probabilities of
receiving and accepting a proposal.
The probability of receiving a proposal. The probability that an a year-old man meets and
receives a marriage proposal from a b year-old woman is
λ1 (a, b) = q1(b) {1−G [R2 (a, b)]} (8)
where R2 (a, b) is the reservation value that b year-old women set for a year-old men. The first
term of Expression (8) is the probability that the meeting takes place, and the second term is
the probability that the woman makes the proposal.
The probability of accepting the proposal and marrying. The probability that an a year-old
man accepts the proposal of a b year-old woman and marries her is
γ1 (a, b) = λ1 (a, b) {1−G [R1 (a, b)]} (9)
where R1 (a, b) is the reservation value that a year-old men set for b year-old women. The first
term of Expression (9) is the probability of receiving the proposal and the second term is the
probability of accepting it. Consequently, the probability that a single a year-old man marries
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a woman of any age is
Γ1(a) =
T∑
b=16
γ1 (a, b) (10)
Naturally the probability of a marriage depends on the reservation values of both spouses.
Specifically, it is straight-forward to show that
Γ1(a) =
T∑
b=16
q1(b) {1−G [R2 (a, b)]} {1−G [R1 (a, b)]} . (11)
The expected value of marrying. The value that an a year-old groom expects to obtain from
marrying a b year-old bride who has drawn realization x2 and has proposed to him is
EM1 (a, b, x2) = u1(x2, y1a, y2b) +
D∑
`=1
β`p1(a, a+`)p2(b, b+`)u1(x2, y1,a+`, y2,b+`)+
T−a−15∑
`=1
β`p1(a, a+`)[1− p2(b, b+`)]v1(y1,a+`) (12)
where D = min{T−a−15, T−b−15}. The first term of Expression (12) is the value of the
first period of the marriage. The second term is the value of the marriage during its expected
duration. And the third term is the utility of widowerhood during its expected duration.
The expected value of remaining single. The value that an a year-old man expects to obtain
from remaining single is
ES1(a) = v1(y1a) +
T−a−15∑
`=1
β`p1(a, a+`)×{
T∑
b=16
γ1 (a, b)EM1 [a, b, x2 | x2 ≥ R1(a, b)] + [1− Γ1(a+ `)] v1(y1,a+`)
}
(13)
The first term in the curly brackets of Expression (13) is the expected value of getting married
before a meeting takes place and the second term is the expected value of remaining single.
Reservation values. The optimal reservation values that a year-old men and b year-old
women set for each other can be found solving the system of 2T 2 equations in 2T 2 unknowns
that results from equating the T 2 expressions (12) and (13) for the men and the corresponding
T 2 equations for the women. Formally, the {R1(a, b)} are the T 2 values of x2 that solve the
T 2 equations
EM1 (a, b, x2) = ES1 (a) (14)
one for each value of a, b ∈ {16, 17, . . . , T}. Similarly, the {R2(a, b)} are the T 2 values of x1
that solve the T 2 equations
EM2 (a, b, x1) = ES2 (b) (15)
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2.10 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is an invariant measure of people, singles, and
married people, {ni(j), si(j), mi(j)} and a matrix of the optimal reservation values that
singles set for each other, {R1(a, b), R2(a, b)}, for i ∈ {1, 2} and a, b, j ∈ {16, 17, . . . , T} such
that:
(i) Measure {ni(j)} satisfies Expressions (1) and (2)
(ii) Measure {si(j)} satisfies
si(16) = ni(16) and (16)
si(j + 1) = σij [1− Γi(j)] si(j) for j < 16 ≤ T (17)
where the Γi(j) are defined in Expression (10)
(iii) Measure {mi(j)} satisfies
mi(j) = ni(j)− si(j) (18)
(iv) The reservation values {R1(a, b), R2(a, b)} solve the decision problems of singles described
in Expressions (14) and (15).
3 Calibration
To calibrate our model economy we must choose the duration of the model period, a functional
form for the distribution function of the match values, G(x), and a value for every parameter
in our model economies. These parameters are the maximum life-time, T , the measures of 16
year-olds, ni(16), the survival probabilities, σij , the limits of the fecundity functions, αi and δi,
the life-time profiles of earnings, yij , the discount factor, β, the parameters that characterize
the payoffs, k, φ, and θ, and the parameter that measures the search friction, ρ.
Model period. Our main source of demographic data is the United State Census of the year
2000. To be consistent with this data source we assume than the model period is yearly.
Match values. We assume that the distribution of match values is a uniform distribution
with support on [0, 1].
Maximum life-time, T . We assume that T = 92. We choose this age because the United
States Census of the year 2000 supplies information on marriages up to that age only.
Measures of 16 year-olds, ni. We normalize the measures of 16 year-old entrants to be
n1(16) = n2(16) = 100. According to the Census of the year 2000 the total sex ratio at age
13
16 in the United States was 1.04. But it declines monotonically to reach 0.95 at age 22. In
our model economy we chose to make this ratio equal to one because it is approximately the
average of those two values and because we take our survival probabilities from a different
dataset.
Survival probabilities, σij. We take the survival probabilities from the Human Mortality
Database for the year 2000. See Panel A of Figure 1.7
Fecundity functions, αi and δi. We choose the limits of the fecundity function to be roughly
consistent with the findings of Hassan and Killick (2003) and Wood and Weinstein (1988)
discussed in Section 2.3 above. Specifically we assume that the fecundity of men is equal to
one between ages 16 and 54, that it declines linearly between ages 55 and 70, and that it is
equal to zero afterwards. Similarly, we assume that the fecundity of women is equal to one
between ages 16 and 34, that it declines linearly between ages 35 and 70, and that it is equal
to zero afterwards. Consequently α1 = 55, α2 = 35, δ1 = 70, and δ2 = 50. See Panel B of
Figure 1.
Wage profiles, yij. To characterize the gender and age profiles of wages we fit a four-degree
polynomial to the data on earnings reported in the year 2000 United States Census. See
Panel C of Figure 1.
Discount factor, β. We choose β = 0.96. This choice is standard in the literature and it
implies that the yearly discount rate is four percent.
The number of children, k. Comparing fertility rates in our model economy and in the
United States is tricky. This because in our model economy we assume that women beget all
their children instantaneously upon marriage. And because only couples that remain married
for their entire lifetimes beget children. Moreover, we have assumed that k = µf1af2b and
we have already chosen the values of the fij . Therefore, to determine the fertility of every
marriage, we have to choose the value of only one parameter, µ. We choose µ = 2.05. This
choice implies that the number of children that women expect to bear in our model economy
coincides with Total Fertility Rate reported by the National Center of Health Statistics for
the United States economy for the year 2000.8
The economies of scale of marriage, φ. To calculate the economies of scale in consumption
that result from income sharing and cohabitation, we use the “OECD-modified scale”. This
scale was proposed by Haagenars, de Vos and Zaidi (1994). It assigns a value of 1 to the
7The Human Mortality Database is compiled by the University of California, Berkeley (USA) and the Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). This dataset is available at www.mortality.org.
8The total fertility rate computed by the National Center of Health Statistics is the sum of the birth rates of
mothers in 5-year age groups multiplied by five. The birth rates are the numbers of live births per 1,000 women
in a given age group. Beginning in 1970, the total fertility rate excludes the children born by nonresidents. The
National Center of Health Statistics data is available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t991x07.pdf.
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household head, a value of 0.5 to each additional adult member of the household, and a value
of 0.3 to each child. Therefore, when an a year-old groom marries a b year-old bride their
scale factor is φ = (1.5 + 0.3k)−1 = (1.5 + 0.3µf1af2b)−1. Parameter φ depends on the ages
of the bride and the groom at the time of the marriage, and its value remains unchanged for
the entire duration of the marriage. To simplify the notation, we omit the age subscripts also
from this parameter.
Free Parameters, ρ and θ. To complete the calibration of our benchmark model economy
we are left with two free parameters only: the parameter that measures the search friction,
ρ, and the parameter that determines utility share of being part of a family, θ. To choose
the numerical values of these two parameters we target the median ages of first-time brides
and grooms in the United States according to the Census for the year 2000. Our numerical
procedure is the following: first we define two evenly spaced grids of 100 points for θ and ρ
on the interval (0, 1), and then we choose the values of θ and ρ that minimize the sum of the
squared differences between the model economy median ages of first-time brides and of grooms
and our targets. The values of ρ and θ that deliver this result are ρ = 0.4326 and θ = 0.3594.
Data Sources. Unless otherwise indicated, our data source for all the statistics reported in
this article for the United States economy is the United States Census for the year 2000.9
4 Findings
The mechanism behind the workings or our model economy is deceivingly simple. It is a double-
sided search model embodied in an overlapping generations economy. Our model economy
is populated by people who live for many years, who receive a deterministic endowment of
earnings, who have a deterministic and age-dependent fecundity, and whose lifetime durations
are random. Singles meet randomly and they decide whether to marry. Nobody else makes
any other economic decisions whatsoever. Since we assume that the numbers of sixteen year-
olds that enter the model economy and the survival probabilities remain constant, the model
economy’s age and sex distribution of people becomes stationary. The utility function and
the search friction carry virtually all the weight of delivering our results. When all is told,
our model economy has only two free parameters. The targets that we choose to determine
their values are two aggregate statistics: the median ages at marriage of first-time brides and
grooms in the United States. We do not use any distributional statistics whatsoever as part
of our calibration targets. Why then should we trust our findings?
9The United States Census for the year 2000 uses the micro dataset collected by the Minnesota Population
Center known as the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 5 percent (see Ruggles, Sobek et al., 2003).
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4.1 Reasons to trust our findings
Our findings are trustworthy because our benchmark model economy replicates the essential
features of the United States marriage market, in spite of its simplicity and in spite of having
only two free parameters. We make this claim because our benchmark model economy approx-
imates the United States the age and sex distributions of both ever and never married people,
the age distributions of the probabilities of grooms marrying younger brides and of brides mar-
rying younger grooms, and even the age distributions of birth-rates, to a comfortingly large
extent. See Figure 2.
In Panels A through D of Figure 2 we report the age and sex distributions of the ever
and never married people. We find that the differences between the model economy numbers
and the United States data are encouragingly small. In Panels E and F we report the age
distributions of the probabilities of grooms marrying younger brides and of brides marrying
younger grooms. Once again, we find that, with some exceptions, the similarities between our
calibrated model economy numbers and the United States data are reassuringly small.
One of the exceptions is the probabilities of marriages between older grooms and younger
brides that go to one as the grooms age in our model economy. This happens for three reasons.
Because of the parsimonious way in which we model the expected values of being single and
married. Because in our model economy everybody of the same sex and age has the same
earnings. And because it turns out that single men refuse to marry any woman older than
themselves after a given age. Similar reasons drive to zero the probabilities of marriages
between older brides and younger grooms. This is the other exception.10
Finally, in Panels G and E of Figure 2 we report the age distributions of the first and the
total birth-rates in our calibrated model economy and in the United States. These results
are harder to interpret. This is because we assume that every child is begot instantaneously
when a fecund marriage is formed. And because only marriages who will stay together for their
entire lifetimes bear children in our model economy. In spite of these difficulties in interpreting
our results, we are encouraged by the fact that the shapes of the distributions of the birth
rates are reasonably similar in our model economy and in the United States.11
Overall we consider our distributional results to be both interesting and encouraging. First,
because we are the first to provide them in the literature.12 Second, because they do not arise
by construction since we have used only the median ages of first-time brides and grooms as our
10See the discussion of this feature of our model economy in Section 4.2.
11To compute the birth-rates in our model economy we use its stationary distribution of women and the
procedure used by the National Center of Health Statistics to compute the fertility rates in the United States
described in Footnote 8.
12Giolito (2003) and (2005) also contain similar distributional results but they are previous versions of this
paper.
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calibration targets. And, third, because we can interpret them as overidentification results that
come convincingly close to their targets. Consequently, we contend that our model economy
is a useful abstraction to quantify the contributions of gender differences in fecundity and in
earnings to account for the timing of first marriages.
4.2 The benchmark model economy
In our model economies people value marriage because it allows them to partake of the joys
of family-life and because it allows them to share their income with someone else’s. When
two singles meet they observe their ages and match values. They compare the expected
values of their marriage with the expected values of remaining single and perhaps marrying
somebody else sometime in the future. Their reservation values are the match values that
make them indifferent between proposing and remaining single. For match values greater
than this reservation value they propose, and for smaller match values they remain single.
These reservation values are a compact way to describe the marriage decision, because they
summarize both its individual and its aggregate aspects. In Panels A through G of Figure 3
represent the reservation values that obtain in our benchmark model economy for singles of
various ages. We discuss them in the following paragraphs.
Consider for instance Panel B. It represents the reservation values of thirty year-old singles.
At thirty, both men and women are maximally fecund. Consider first the case of men. The
reservation value of thirty year-old men for 16 year-old women is 0.78. It decreases monoton-
ically with the woman’s age until it reaches its minimum at 0.66 for thirty year-old women.
This is because thirty year-old women are still maximally fecund, and because their increasing
earnings profile more than compensates for their increased mortality risk. The reservation val-
ues of thirty year-old men increase monotonically for women older than thirty and they reach
a value of 1.00 at age 46. This is because the reduced fecundity and the increased mortality
risk of older women lower their value and more than compensate for their increasing earnings
profile. Notice that the graph becomes steeper when women’s fecundity starts to decrease
after age 35 and that it becomes 1.00 at age 46 when the women’s fecundity is only 0.2. We
interpret a reservation value of 1.00 to mean that in our model economy thirty year-old men
never marry women older than 45.
Next consider the case of thirty year-old women. The shape of their reservation value
function is very similar to the one of thirty year-old men, but their lower earnings and the
pressure of their biological clock —they only have four years left of full fecundity— conspire to
make women much less choosy. The reservation value of thirty year-old women for 16 year-old
men is only 0.56 and it decreases with the men’s age until it reaches its minimum at 0.4 for
32 year-old men. Notice that this minimum is 0.24 smaller than that of thirty year-old men.
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And also that the most desired men for thirty year-old women are aged 32, while the most
desired women for thirty year-old men are aged only thirty. Finally, thirty year-old women
are willing to marry older men to age 61. This is because the fecundity of 61 year-old men is
still reasonably high (0.53), and so are their earnings (1.35).
In Panels A, C and D of Figure 3 we report the reservation values for 20, 40, and 50 year-old
men and women for partners of all ages. Qualitatively, those figures display u-shapes that are
very similar to those in Panel B. Quantitatively, the graphs are rather different but they all
display similar patterns. In every graph the reservation values of the men are uniformly and
sizably bigger than those of the women —except in the part of the range when they are both
equal to one. This means that men are choosier than women of the same age. This result
contrasts with those reported in part the literature where men use their higher earnings to
compete for the relatively scarce women that are fecund and, hence, presumably choosier (see
Siow, 1998). In every graph represented in those panels the minima of the reservation values
of the men occur before those of the women. This means that the most preferred spouses for
men are always younger than the most preferred spouses for women of the same age. Finally,
in every single case the women are willing to accept spouses that are very much older than
they are, and the men are very much less willing to do so.
In Panel E of Figure 3 we report the reservation values of men of ages 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60
and in Panel F we report the corresponding values for women. We find that the highest graph
corresponds to the thirty year-old men, followed by the forty year-olds and by the twenty
year-olds. Quite naturally fifty and sixty year-olds come last. Thirty year-old men are the
choosiest. This is because they are maximally fecund and their earnings are already fairly
high. Consequently their value as spouses is high. Moreover their value of remaining single is
also high because they are young enough to afford to do some further resampling in the future.
Forty year-olds, although still maximally fecund and earnings richer than thirty year-olds, are
a bit more in a hurry. Therefore they are willing to accept matches of a somewhat lower
quality. Twenty year-olds come next because their earnings are still in the lower part of their
range and this reduces both their value as spouses and their value of remaining single.
Panel F shows some interesting differences in the case of women. Their reduced fecundity
span makes twenty year-old women the choosiest because they are the ones who can afford
to wait the longest. Thirty year-olds come in at a close second place. And the gap between
them and both forty and fifty year-olds, whose reservation are very similar, is large. Forty
year-old women are still fecund and they refuse to marry infecund men. Not so fifty year-olds
who are willing to marry men to age 71. Therefore, forty year-old women are choosier than
fifty year-olds when it comes to men who are older than 34. In contrast, since fifty year-old
women can no longer have children, they are more demanding when it comes to younger men
because their earnings are low. This makes fifty year-old women choosier than forty year-olds
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when it comes to men up to age 34.
Finally, in Panel G of Figure 3 we report the shares of ever married men and women of
various ages and in Panel H we report the single sex ratios, which we define as the number of
single men divided by the number of single women. We find that the ever married shares are
very similar for young people, although slightly larger for women than for men. For instance,
at age twenty, 22.3 percent of the women and 20.7 percent of the men are or have been married.
Later in life, these gender differences become larger. At age thirty, 63.9 percent of the women
and 55.0 percent of the men are or have been married. And by age 40 these numbers are
85.2 and 74.1 percent. Since, overall men are choosier than women of the same age, women
marry earlier than men of the same age, and single women outnumber single men of the same
age until age 57. The single sex ratio is greater than one and hump-shaped between ages 16
and 56, it reaches and maximum value of 1.79 at age 43 and it becomes less than one and
decreasing form age 57 onwards, when the higher mortality rates of men start to reduce their
numbers.
4.3 Earnings, fecundity, and the timing of first marriages
To quantify the contributions of gender differences in earnings and in fecundity to account
for the timing of first marriages, we solve three counterfactual model economies. In the first
counterfactual model economy men and women are exactly alike. They all have the same
life-time earnings and fecundity profiles as the men in the benchmark model economy, and the
same survival probabilities as the women. We call this model economy Economy E1. In the
second counterfactual model economy men and women differ in their earnings profiles only,
and in the third one they differ in their fecundity profiles only. We call these model economies
Economy E2 and Economy E3. In Table 2 we report the main statistics that describe marriage
behavior in these model economies. In Figures 4, 5 and in Panels A through D of Figure 6 we
plot several arrangements of the reservation values of people of various ages. And in Panel E
of Figure 6 we plot their single sex ratios.
4.3.1 Earnings and the timing of first marriages
First, we discuss the role of earnings in accounting for the timing of first marriages. To do
so we compare counterfactual Economies E1 and E2. In Economy E1 men and women are
identical and in Economy E2 they differ in their earnings profiles only. This change decreases
women’s earnings in every period of their lives. Since the women of every age are poorer in
Economy E2 than in Economy E1, they value less any given marriage proposal because in
Economy E2 there is less income to share. Moreover they also value less their now less affluent
single lives. Quantitatively the reduction in the value of being single dominates because the
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Table 2: Median Ages, Shares of Never Married People, and Sex Ratios
USa E0b E1c E2d E3e ∆f21 ∆
g
31
Groom’s Median Age at First Marriage 26.70 26.67 25.57 25.84 26.98 0.27 1.41
Bride’s Median Age at First Marriage 24.79 24.77 25.57 25.74 24.46 0.17 –1.11
Median Age Difference at First Marriage 1.91 1.91 0.00 0.11 2.52 0.11 2.52
Share of Never Married Men (%) 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.02 0.05
Share of Never Married Women (%) 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.00
Never Married Sex Ratio (M/W) 1.13 1.11 1.00 1.04 1.19 0.04 0.19
Total Sex Ratio (M/W) 0.92 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
aUnited States Economy: The data are taken from U:S. Census data for the year 2000.
bEconomy E0: The benchmark model economy. The earnings and fecundity profiles and the survival probabil-
ities of men and women are taken directly from United States data.
cEconomy E1: Men and women are identical. They all have the earnings and fecundity profiles of the bench-
mark model economy men and the survival probabilities of the benchmark model economy women.
dEconomy E2: Men and women differ in their earnings profiles only.
eEconomy E3: Men and women differ in their fecundity profiles only.
fDifferences between the statistics in Economies E2 and E1.
gDifferences between the statistics in Economies E3 and E1.
earnings of men have not changed. And the women in Economy E2 lower their reservation
values for every man and at every age. Panels B, D, F, and H of Figure 5 confirm this reasoning.
Moreover, reducing the earnings profile of women also reduces the value of married life for
men, who now have to make do with poorer spouses. Consequently, in Economy E2 marriage
becomes a less attractive alternative for men and they increase their reservation match values
for every woman and at every age. Panels A, C, E and G of Figure 5 confirm this reasoning.
Since women internalize the fact that they receive less proposals in Economy E2 than in
Economy E1, they become even less choosy. And they reduce their reservation values more
than what they would have done if this general equilibrium effect had been absent.
Panels A through D of Figure 4 show that reducing the earnings of women drives a wedge
between the reservation values of men and women of every age. With men becoming choosier
and women becoming less choosy their median ages at first marriage could go either way. It
turns out that increasing the earnings profile of women delays the median age at first marriage
of both men and women. Men’s median age by 0.27 years —from 25.57 in Economy E1 to
25.84 in Economy E2— and women’s by 0.17 years —from 25.57 to 25.74 (see the rightmost
panel of Table 2). When we put these two effects together, it turns out that increasing the
earnings of women reduces the age difference at first marriage by only 0.11 years.
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4.3.2 Fecundity and the timing of first marriages
Next, we discuss the role played by fecundity in accounting for the timing of first marriages.
To do so we compare counterfactual Economies E1 and E3. In Economy E1 men and women
are identical and in Economy E3 they differ in their fecundity profiles only. In Panels A, C,
E, and G of Figure 5 and Panel A of Figure 6 we show that reducing the fecundity of women
increases the value of younger women slightly, and that it reduces the value of older women
sizably for men who are between 20 and 60 years old. By older women we mean those who
are fecund in Economy E1 and who are barren in Economy E3. The crossing points of the
reservation value functions of fecund men are between 39 and 34 years in every case. Age 35
is precisely when the fecundity of women in Economy E3 starts to decrease.
More interestingly, when there are no gender differences in fecundity, younger men are
willing to marry women up to a sizably older age. Consider for instance the case of thirty year
old men. In Economy E3 they refuse to marry any woman older than 48. And in Economy E1
they are willing to marry up to 59 year-old women. Finally, Panel C of Figure 6 shows that the
reservation values of 70 year old men in Economies E1 and E3 are identical. This is because
70 year-old men are no longer fertile and therefore they are indifferent to the increased fertility
of women.
In contrast, reducing the fecundity of women changes their reservation values in an inter-
esting way that is not monotonic in their age. Panel B of Figure 5 and Panel D of Figure 6
show that the reservation values of women who are twenty and seventy are al most identical in
Economies E1 and E3. Panels D and F of Figure 5 show that thirty and forty year old women
become less choosy in Economy E3. And Panel H of Figure 5 and Panel B of Figure 6 show
that fifty and sixty year-old women become choosier in Economy E3.
Twenty year-old women are almost indifferent between Economies E1 and E3 because, even
though they are less fecund in Economy E3 and this reduces their value of remaining single,
they have fifteen years of full fecundity ahead of them and this is ample time to find a good
spouse. Moreover, their search costs are sizably smaller in Economy E3 because the sex ratio
of singles is significantly higher (see Panel E of Figure 6). And this allows them to be choosier.
The case of seventy year old women is different. Their reservation values are the same in
Economies E1 and E3 because at that age they are infecund in both models. Therefore,
nothing much has changed for them.
Thirty and forty year-old women are less choosy in Economy E3 because the increased
pressure from their biological clock increases their search costs and it reduces their values of
being single. The cases of fifty and sixty year-old women are perhaps the most interesting. In
Economy E3 fifty and sixty year-old women can no longer bear children, and this makes them
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demand a high match value if they are to marry. In contrast, in Economy E1 fifty and sixty
year-old women are still fecund and they are approaching the end of their fecund years —in
Economy E1 their fecundity starts to decrease at age 55 and they become infecund at age 69.
This makes them willing to accept a spouse with a lower match value as long as he is fecund.
This substitution effect —children for a higher match value— is reinforced at age fifty by the
fact that the singles sex ratio is still sizably higher in Economy E3 than Economy E1 (see
Panel E of Figure 6). The overall result is that fifty and sixty year-old women are choosier in
the low fecundity world of Economy E3.
With twenty and seventy year-olds being indifferent, forty and fifty year-olds being less
choosy, and sixty and seventy year-olds being choosier, the aggregate result could go either
way. However, since in model Economy E3 approximately eighty percent of the women marry
before they are forty, it turns out that the reduced choosiness of younger women brought about
by the increased pressures from their biological clock dominates.
Panel E of Figure 6 shows that in Economy E3 fecund women are clearly the short side
of the marriage market. Specifically, the single sex ratio increases continuously from age 16
onwards and it reaches a maximum of no less than 1.83 at age 44. At age 49, when women
are no longer fecund, it is still 1.65. The literature has picked up on this result, and it has
interpreted it to imply that this gives market power to fecund women who demand some form
of compensation if they are to marry.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we endogenize the single sex ratio
fully. Second, we show that women’s shorter biological clock is a mixed blessing. It gives
market power to young women in their twenties and it indeed makes them choosier than
young men of the same age (see Panel E of Figure 4). However, by age 30 this situation is
completely reversed. In spite of women still being the short side of the market by far, the
increased pressure of their biological clocks make 30 and 40 year old women less choosy than
men of their same age (see Panels F and G of Figure 4). We interpret this to mean that if
there was any compensation it would go the other way. The women would have to compensate
the men.
When we put all these effects together it results that decreasing the fecundity of women
delays the median age of first-time grooms by 1.57 years, from 25.57 years in the Economy E1
to 27.14 in Economy E3 (see Table 2). And that it advances the median age of first time brides
by 1.22 years, from 25.57 to 24.35 years. The resulting gender age gap at first marriage is of a
whooping 2.79 years. Which dwarfs the 0.11 years that arise in Economy E2 where men and
women differ in their wages only.
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5 Concluding comments
In this article we provide a simple model of the marriage market where singles search for
spouses. We show that modeling the marriage decision in a very simple model economy is
sufficient to account for much of the observed marriage behavior in the United States in the
year 2000. We conclude that gender differences in fecundity are all important in accounting
for marriage behavior, and that differences in earnings matter little. We also conclude that,
even though they are in short supply, the market power of fecund women is not enough for
them to demand compensation in all cases. And that studying the marriage decision without
modeling explicitly the roles played by age and by fecundity, as has been typically done by
the previous literature, makes little sense.
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Figure 1: Biological and Economic Gender Differences
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Figure 2: Calibration Results
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Figure 3: Simulation Results: The Benchmark Model Economy (E0)
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Figure 4: The Role of Earnings and the Role of Fecundity
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Figure 5: The Roles of Earnings and Fecundity Compared (1)
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Figure 6: The Roles of Earnings and Fecundity Compared (and 2)
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